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FLINT'S RADICAL MOLINIST CHRISTOLOGY 
NOT RADICAL ENOUGH 
William Lane Craig 
In a pair of recent articles Thomas Flint has offered what he calls "some radi-
cal Molinist suggestions" for Christology. In the first of the pair, he argues 
that despite divine impeccability Christ's individual human nature had the 
freedom to sin, but that were it to do so, then Christ's individual human na-
ture would not have been hypostatically united with the divine nature of 
the second person of the Trinity, that is to say, that individual human nature 
would have been a human person. God infallibly preserved the sinlessness 
of Christ's individual human nature by not permitting it to be placed in cir-
cumstances in which God knew that it would sin. In the second of his two 
articles Flint draws out some of the truly radical implications which seem to 
flow naturally from such a thesis. He argues, for example, that anyone of our 
individual human natures, rather than Christ's, might have been hypostati-
cally united with the second person of the Trinity. In this response I argue that 
Flint's Molinist Christological reflections do not constitute a viable approach 
to the problem of the freedom of Christ's human nature to sin. Nonetheless, I 
think his reflections do have the salutary effect of raising profound questions 
about how best to preserve the integrity of Christ's person within the context 
of a two nahues Christology, questions which merit further exploration. 
1. 
In a pair of recent articles Thomas Flint has offered what he calls "some 
radical Molinist suggestions" for Christology.l In the first of the pair, pub-
lished in this journal, he argues that despite Christ's impeccability his in-
dividual human nature (that body/soul composite that walked the hills 
of Galilee) had the freedom to sin, but that were it to do so, then Christ's 
individual human nature would not have been hypostatically united with 
the divine nature of the second person of the Trinity, that is to say, that in-
dividual human nature would have been a human person. God infallibly 
preserved the sinlessness of Christ's individual human nature by not per-
mitting it to be placed in circumstances in which God knew that it would 
sin.2 In the second of his two articles Flint draws out some of the truly 
radical implications which seem to flow naturally from such a thesis. He 
argues, for example, that anyone of our individual human natures, rather 
than Christ's, might have been hypostatically united with the second per-
son of the Trinity. 
In this response I shall argue that Flint's Molinist Christological reflec-
tions do not constitute a viable approach to the problem of the freedom of 
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Christ's human nature to sin. Nonetheless, I think his reflections do have 
the salutary effect of raising profound questions about how best to pre-
serve the integrity of Christ's person within the context of a two natures 
Christology, questions which merit further exploration. 
II. 
In his initial article, Flint argues, as mentioned, that Christ's individual 
human nature (CHN) had the freedom to sin, but that were it to do so, 
then CHN would not have been assumed by a divine person but would 
instead have been a human person. Flint's view is extraordinarily subtle. 
He is not claiming that Christ had the freedom to sin, for "Christ" refers 
to the person who, subsequent to the incarnation, possesses two natures, 
human and divine, and that person is the second person of the Trinity and 
therefore incapable of sinning. The idea, rather, is that Christ's individual 
human nature-which is not, contra Nestorianism, a person-had the 
freedom to sin and so could have been a person in its own right, a human 
person distinct from the second person of the Trinity, a person who would, 
like us, just be the body/soul composite that it, in fact, is. 
In so arguing, however, Flint does not address an objection implicit 
in the earlier work of his colleague Alfred Freddoso which threatens to 
undo Flint's entire scheme.3 The operative question motivating Freddoso's 
Christological reflections is: Could CHN have possibly existed without be-
ing assumed by a divine person? Noting that medieval theologians were 
careful not to say that Christ is a human person-rather he is a divine 
person who has assumed a human nature-Freddoso is asking, in effect, 
whether CHN could have been a human person. 
He argues that this is, in fact, impossible. Noting that Scotus and Ock-
ham held that God might at any time assume some individual human 
nature, Freddoso imagines a scenario according to which God assumes 
an already existing human nature N and after a time breaks off this union. 
Now Scotus and Ockham affirm (and Freddoso concurs) that before and 
after its assumption by God, N is identical to a human person, say, Socrates. 
But what happens to Socrates during N's hypostatic union with the divine 
nature? What Christologically orthodox theologians cannot say is that the 
person who is Socrates continues to exist during the time of the assump-
tion of Socrates' human nature by a divine person, for that would be to 
fall into the heresy of Nestorianism (affirming two persons or hypostases, 
one human and one divine, during the Incarnation). One answer is to say 
that Socrates ceased to exist during the period of N's assumption and then 
resumed his existence thereafter. But this answer violates the law of the 
Indiscernibility of Identicals. For one may argue 
1. N is identical with Socrates. 
2. N has the property of being necessarily such that it exists when and 
only when N exists. 
3. Therefore, Socrates has the property of being necessarily such that 
he exists when and only when N exists. 
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Hence, one must maintain that since Socrates is identical with N , he does 
exist throughout the time of N 's hypostatic union with the divine nature. 
But Socrates cannot be a human person during the time of N 's assump-
tion. Obviously, Socrates could not have somehow become the divine per-
son, for the divine person pre-existed the assumption of N, and such an 
apotheosis is both metaphysically impossible and smells of Adoptionism. 
Therefore, one is forced to embrace the answer that while Socrates con-
tinues to exist during N 's assumption, he ceases to be a person during 
that time. In short, Socrates is only contingently a person. But it is wildly 
counter-intuitive to maintain that a human person is only contingently a 
person. 
Therefore, Freddoso concludes, we should embrace the following 
principle: 
R. Necessarily, each individual human nature is either (a) necessarily 
such that it is a human person (and, hence, not assumed by a divine 
person), or (b) necessarily such that it is assumed by a divine person 
(and, hence, is not a human person). 
In accord with (R) we must say, then, that CHN is necessarily not a human 
person and therefore cannot exist apart from its assumption by a divine 
person. 
It is the implication of Freddoso's argument that it is metaphysically 
impossible that CHN should exist apart from its union with the Logos, 
the second person of the Trinity. It is worth noting that nothing essential 
to Freddoso's argument hangs upon the transitory character of God's as-
sumption of some individual human nature, as envisioned by Scotus and 
Ockham. Even if such divine "body snatching" were impossible, so that 
an individual human nature must be either assumed by a divine person 
permanently throughout its lifetime or not at all, it would remain the case 
that some human nature which is identical to a human person might not 
have ever been a human person, since there are possible worlds in which 
that nature is from birth assumed by a divine person. 
If Freddoso's argument is sound, it spoils Flint's thesis. Flint explains 
his position as follows: 
there is no possible world in which an assumed human nature sins. 
So, given that CHN is assumed, it follows with certainty that CHN 
does not sin. Still, CHN is able to sin. That is to say, CHN has access 
to worlds in which CHN sins. What follows, it seems clear, is that 
CHN has access to worlds in which CHN is not assumed. That is to 
say, CHN has the power so to act that CHN never would have been 
assumed had it so acted.4 
Clearly, if Freddoso's argument is correct, CHN cannot have access to 
worlds in which it is not assumed and, hence, to worlds in which CHN 
sins, for there are no such worlds. Furthermore, Flint's counterfactual "Had 
CHN so acted, it would never have been assumed" is then what Flint has 
elsewhere called a "collapsing counterfactual."5 For the consequent clause 
is true only in worlds in which CHN does not exist; there is no world in 
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which CHN exists without being assumed. But then the counterfactual's 
antecedent clause is false in all worlds in which CHN does not exist, for 
CHN cannot act in such a way if CHN does not exist. The counterfactual 
is thus self-defeating and cannot be true. 
More specifically, consider Flint's counterfactual 
4.' (-A & D*)O-S, 
where A stands for CHN's being assumed, D* for a set of circumstances 
contingently implying CHN's sinning, and 5 for CHN's sinning. Notice that 
if Freddoso is correct, (4') has an impossible antecedent. Although such 
counterfactuals turn out to be trivially true on the customary Stalnaker-
Lewis semantics, Freddoso is prepared to challenge those semantics and 
would allow that (4') could be non-trivially true and so part of God's middle 
knowledge, as Flint claims.6 Suppose it were. Could it also be the case that 
4. D* 0-5 
is not part of God's middle knowledge? Flint finds this "preposterous."7 But 
on F reddoso's analysis, (4') could be true because there is no possible world 
in which CHN exists without being assumed and, hence, the conjunction 
of -A and D* is impossible. But (4) does not have an impossible antecedent. 
CHN would well be in circumstances D*; only in such circumstances it will 
be an assumed nature and so incapable of sinning. Hence, (4) will be false 
and so not part of God's middle knowledge. Furthermore, Flint's 
P. Necessarily, if an individual human nature is assumed in freedom-
retaining circumstances such that, had it been in those circumstances 
but not been assumed, it would have freely done x, then the indi-
vidual human nature freely does X,8 
when applied to CHN involves a counterfactual with an impossible ante-
cedent, namely, had CHN been in those circumstances but not been assumed. 
Flint symbolizes (P) in application to his example as 
5. {A & D* & [(-A & D*) O-S]} 0-5. 
From (5) and 
6. (A & D*) 0- -5, 
he deduces 
7. -0 {A & D* & [(-A & D*) 0-5]). 
The problem is that the proposition symbolized by the operand in (7) 
evidently is possible on Freddoso's analysis, for it states that CHN is as-
sumed and is in D* and that a counterfactual about CHN with an impos-
sible antecedent is true, all of which is unobjectionable. Since (6) is obvi-
ously true, (5) must be false. It is not the case that, necessarily, if CHN is 
assumed and is in D* and a counterfactual about CHN with an impos-
sible antecedent is true, then CHN sins. Thus, if Freddoso is right, Flint's 
argument is unsound. 
Finally, Flint sees no merit in the claim that acknowledged truths like 
3**. (A & D) 0--5, 
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point to CHN's lack of freedom in situations in which CHN is assumed by 
a divine person. For it is also true that 
F. Were CHN to have sinned, CHN would not have been assumed.9 
Given Christ's impeccability, Flint must take (F) to be necessarily true. The 
problem with this response is that it assumes that if CHN had not been 
assumed, it would have been a human person. But if Freddoso is correct, 
it is rather the case that, necessarily, 
G. If CHN had not been assumed, CHN would not have existed. 
For in no world is CHN a human person; hence in the closest worlds to the 
actual world in which the antecedent of (G) is true the consequent of (G) is 
also true. But since necessarily true counterfactuals reduce to entailments, 
it follows from (F) and (G) that 
H. Were CHN to have sinned, CHN would not have existed, 
which is, as I say, a collapsing counterfactual which cannot be true. H) There-
fore if Freddoso is right that (G) is necessarily true, (F) must be false, being 
lrevealed as itself a collapsing counterfactual. We cannot, on Freddoso's 
view, defend Christ's freedom by claiming that CHN was able to sin but 
Ithat were it to do so, it would have been a merely human person.]] 
Why is this internecine debate worth all the bother? The answer is to 
Ibe found in an issue which lies just beneath the surface, namely, the ques-
tion, Could you or I have been God? This question should not be construed to 
mean, Could the person I am have been a divine hypostasis?, for that is clearly 
impossible. Rather the question should be taken to mean, Could the indi-
vidual human nature which I in fact am have instead been the human nature of 
tl divine hypostasis? Could the divine Logos have been incarnated as me 
instead of as Jesus of Nazareth? The question is so repugnant as to seem 
blasphemous. And yet it is the implication of Flint's view that Christ's in-
dividual human nature could have existed independently of its assump-
tion by the divine Logos; it could instead have been a human person, hav-
ing its own proper hypostasis. As such it does not differ from any other 
individual human nature. Thus, any human nature is in potentiality to 
being assumed by a divine person. It is the merit of Freddoso's analysis to 
reject this conclusion as metaphysically impossible. 
III. 
In the second of his pair of articles, Flint does address Freddoso's objec-
tion. 12 He recasts it as an argument which Socrates might offer: 
8. I am identical with Socrates. 
9. I cannot exist without being a person. 
10. Therefore, Socrates cannot exist without being a person. 
He acknowledges that Freddoso's argument presents a challenge to his 
Thesis 4: It's possible that CHN exist as an independent, unassumed 
suppositum. 
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For according to Thesis 4, an individual human nature which is not in fact 
a person could have been a person. But if Freddoso is correct that person-
hood is not a property which a thing contingently possesses, then Thesis 
4 is false. 
Flint, however, rejoins that (9) draws its plausibility from the presup-
position that its denial would imply that I might exist in some utterly im-
personal manner. But the doctrine of the Incarnation should alert us to 
another alternative, which is expressed in 
9*. I cannot exist without either being a person or being sustained by a 
person. 
Flint believes that (9*) captures the intuition behind (9) while still allow-
ing that being a person is a property that human natures only contingently 
possess. 
One might well challenge Flint's claim that his (9*) adequately captures 
the intuition behind (9). For the "I" in (9*) is a personal indexical whose 
referent is the person whom we imagine to be asserting (9*). (9*) informs 
us that a necessary condition of that person's existing is his either being a 
person or being sustained by a person. But notice that in the second case 
envisioned, it is a different person who is the sustainer. As Flint acknowl-
edges, if God were to assume the individual human nature of an already 
existing human person, then "that would be to eliminate that nature's 
personhood."13 But then it seems incoherent to assert that "I can exist by 
being sustained by a person." For were I to be sustained by a (different) 
person, then I should not exist. Thus, there is no possible world in which I 
both exist and am sustained by another person. 
It will do no good to deny that the propositional content expressed 
by (9*) is devoid of the personal indexical element characteristic of its 
sentential expression, for linguistic analysis during the past generation 
has demonstrated convincingly the ineliminability and irreducibility of 
such indexical reference. 14 In asserting (9*) Socrates is not making a claim 
reducible to some third-person assertion about Socrates, but is rather 
referring to himself as himself. Even if we hold that propositional con-
tent is person-neutral, we must still postulate some sort of first-person 
grasping of that content or first-person ascription of properties in order 
to capture the referent of (9*). We shall not be able to escape by holding 
that it is possible that someone other than Socrates (viz., the Logos) might 
grasp that propositional content or self-ascribe the relevant properties in 
a first-person way, for that would be to assert that the second person of 
the Trinity might have been the person Socrates is, which Flint recognizes 
to be incompatible with the doctrine of the Incarnation. The Incarnation 
requires that the assumed nature is not a person but is sustained by one. 
However we choose to analyze propositions expressed by sentences con-
taining first-person indexicals, the point remains that the referent of such 
terms is a person who would not exist were his human nature to be as-
sumed by the Son. Hence, Flint's proposed alternative (9*) seems incoher-
ent, leaving us with (9). 
One might try to defend Flint's alternative in the way that Plantinga has 
defended the existence of haecceities or "thisnesses." Plantinga argues that 
the property which is in fact my thisness can exist without me, though in 
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such a case it would not stand in a thisness of relation to me and so would 
not be my thisness. 15 Could Flint similarly contend that that entity which I 
am could exist without me, but in that case would not stand in the person-
ally identical with relation to me-standing rather in the sustained by rela-
tion to the person of the Son? This seems impossible. For identity relations 
are necessary. Therefore, if I am identical with my human nature, then in 
any world in which that human nature exists, it is I; that is to say, I exist, 
which contradicts the hypothesis. Planting a observes that the real issue 
with respect to haecceities is not whether we can explain which property 
a given haecceity is without referring to the object whose thisness it is, but 
rather whether that property could have been the thing it is if it were not 
the thisness of the object in question. Regardless of whether haecceities 
face such a difficulty (Plantinga thinks not), human natures do: If I had 
not existed, my human nature could not have been the thing it is and so 
cannot exist unless I exist. 
Flint's proposed escape from Freddoso's objection does not therefore seem 
to be viable. This implies that Flint's Molinist reflections do not represent 
a tenable solution to the problem of Christ's impeccability and freedom 
to sin. Nonetheless, I think that his radical reflections are fruitful in that 
they serve to raise even more fundamental questions which dig into the 
very foundations of Christology and thus call for even more radical (in 
the sense of foundational) reflection. For example, if CHN could have ex-
isted as a person independently of being assumed by the Son, then why 
would that same body/soul composite not be a person when united with 
the Son? Why would there not be two Sons, one divine and one human? 
Flint never addresses these questions. If, on the other hand, we deny, as it 
seems we should, that CHN could have existed as a person independently 
of being assumed by the Son, then how can CHN be a complete human 
nature? What is wanting that CHN should not be a person independent of 
its union with the Logos? Neither does Freddoso address these questions. 
lL suggest that in order to answer such questions, we must be prepared to 
think even more radically than Flint has proposed.16 
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6. Freddoso, "Human Nature," p. 43. In particular, Freddoso is willing 
to affirm the non-trivial truth of the counterfactual, "If Christ's individual hu-
man nature existed but were not, by a special act of God, sustained by a divine 
person, then it would not be sustained by a divine person and, hence, would 
be a human person." The antecedent is impossible because CHN cannot exist 
apart from being sustained by a divine person. But if it could and so were a 
human person, there is no reason for Freddoso to deny that that person would 
have sinned if placed in D*. 
Philosophers who believe that there are non-trivially true counterpossibles 
(counterfactuals with impossible antecedents) reject the inference pattern [(P 
0- P) & 0 (P - Q)] - (P 0- Q). For if this inference pattern is valid, then 
one can show that O(P - Q) implies that P 0- Q. But this implication does 
not always hold if there are non-trivially true counterpossibles. For if P is an 
impossible proposition, then P necessarily implies anything and everything. So 
if P is an impossible proposition, then it is true that 0 (P - Q), no matter what 
Q represents. So, for example, it is true both that "Necessarily, if God does not 
exist, the universe does not exist" and "Necessarily, if God does not exist, the 
universe exists anyway." But if there are non-trivially true counterpossibles, it 
does not follow from the truth of "Necessarily, if God does not exist, the uni-
verse exists anyway" that "If God were not to exist, then the universe would 
exist anyway." Thus, if there are non-trivially true counterpossibles, then it is 
not the case that O(P - Q) implies that P 0- Q. But if that implication fails, 
then the transitive inference pattern on which it is based also fails. 
7. Flint, "Molinist Reflections," p. 14. 
8. Ibid., p. 15. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Flint in his discussion of collapsing counterfactuals does say that if the 
antecedent of a collapsing counterfactual is impossible, then there is "no dif-
ficulty" in its being true (Flint, Divine Providence, p. 188). But that is because 
on the usual Stalnaker-Lewis semantics, such counterfactuals all tum out to 
be vacuously true. On the more plausible view that there are counterpossibles 
which are non-trivially true (see note 6 above), the impossibility of a collaps-
ing counterfactual's antecedent cannot alone rescue it from falsehood. 
11. This is not to say that Christ was not free in a libertarian sense. Rather 
we may adopt some sort of Frankfurtian account of libertarian freedom, as 
Morris has done in his Christology (Thomas V. Morris, The Logic of God Incar-
nate [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986], pp. 146-53). 
12. Flint, "Possibilities of Incarnation," pp. 315-18. 
13. Ibid., p. 317. 
14. See, e.g., John Perry, "The Problem of the Essential Indexical/' Nous 13 
(1979): pp. 3-19. 
15. Alvin Plantinga, "Reply to Kit Fine," in Alvin Plantinga, ed. Jas. E. 
Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen, Profiles 5 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), pp. 
335-36. 
16. As I have attempted to do in chapter 29 of J. P. Moreland and William 
Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations of a Christian Worldview (Downer's Grove, 
IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 2003). How would the adoption of a Christology along 
my broadly Apollinarian lines (once rehabilitated to meet the standards of 
orthodoxy) sketched there affect Flint's specific, radical Molinist suggestions? 
It would rule out 
Thesis 1: Necessarily, being assumable is a contingent feature of any as-
sumable individual human nature. 
For the human nature of Christ would be in itself anhypostatic and so can-
not exist apart from its union with the Logos. Hence, the only true counterfac-
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tuals about how CHN would behave if placed in lifelong, freedom-retaining 
circumstances are counterfactuals concerning how the Logos Himself would 
behave under such circumstances. As the second person of the Trinity, the Lo-
gos cannot sin, and thus His refraining from sin under the envisioned circum-
stances is not a contingent matter. Therefore, it is not (necessarily) true that 
the assumability of any assumable individual human nature is a contingent 
feature of that nature. Regardless of which body the Logos chose to be united 
with, the body-soul composite which is the result of the Incarnation and is the 
individual human nature of Christ is incapable of sin, so that its assumability 
is not a contingent feature of it. 
Moreover, it is also false that 
Thesis 2: It's possible that CHN was neither assumed nor assumable. 
For although there are presumably possible worlds in which the Logos 
chooses a different body than that of Jesus of Nazareth in which to be incar-
nate or worlds in which no Incarnation at all takes place, so that it is possible 
that CHN is not assumed, nevertheless CHN is essentially assumable because 
its soul is the Logos, who is impeccable. Therefore, it is impossible for CHN 
to be unassumable. 
My proposed Christology will, however, countenance Flint's 
Thesis 3: It's possible that there be an individual human nature distinct 
from CHN that was both assumable and assumed. 
In order for there to be a distinct individual human nature which is assum-
able by the Logos, all that is required is that the Logos unite with some body 
of flesh other than Jesus of Nazareth's. This is no more problematic than my 
soul's being born with a different body. The union of the Logos with a dif-
ferent flesh would have constituted a distinct individual human nature even 
though the soul of that body would be the same soul as that of Jesus, namely; 
the Logos Himself. We have no reason to deny that in some possible world 
the Logos en-souled some different body than Jesus' body, so that it is pos-
sible that a distinct individual human nature is assumed by the Logos, and is 
therefore assumable. 
I have already rejected 
Thesis 4: It's possible that CHN exist as an independent, unassumed sup-
positum. 
This thesis makes it very difficult to resist Nestorianism. If Jesus of Naza-
reth had a soul distinct from the Logos, so as to be able to exist as an un-
assumed suppositum or hypostasis, then it is extraordinarily difficult to see 
why there would not be in Christ two persons, one human and one divine. 
But Apollinarianism makes the doctrine of enhypostasis, implicit in Cha1ce-
cion, perspicuous. Indeed, the very language of assumption or assumability 
becomes somewhat misleading, for such language conjures up the image of 
the Logos's coming upon or taking on an independently existing body-soul 
composite, or man, which is difficult to distinguish from ordinary indwell-
ing. On an Apollinarian Christology it is preferable to speak of the Logos's 
grounding, rather than assuming, a human nature, for the human nature of 
Christ becomes complete only in its union with the Logos. 
We shall also reject Flint's 
Thesis 5: There are in the actual world individual human natures distinct 
from CHN that were assumable. 
For while it is true that the Logos could have been united with a body 
physically indistinguishable from that of, say, Bill Clinton's, nevertheless He 
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could not have assumed any human nature that was a complete body-soul 
composite. For then there would have been two persons, one human and 
one divine. 
Finally, we shall for the same reason reject 
Thesis 6: Necessarily, every human nature is possibly assumed. 
For any human nature existing independently of the Logos is personally 
impenetrable to, even if indwellable by, the Logos. 
Thus, I think that most of Flint's radical Molinist suggestions for Christol-
ogy ought to be rejected. Their unacceptability springs, not merely from Flint's 
analysis of the freedom of Christ's human nature to sin, but also from broad, 
fundamental Christological considerations which confront any Chalcedonian 
theology. In order to secure a genuine Incarnation while avoiding Nestorian-
ism, I suggest that we take another look at Apollinarianism, suitably rehabili-
tated. But once we have taken that radical route, we find that we have good 
reason to reject Flint's own radical suggestions. 
My thanks to anonymous referees for helpful comments on the first draft 
of this paper. 
